

## **APPENDIX C**

### **OVERVIEW OF OTHER INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON POSTWAR IRAQ**

## **APPENDIX C: Overview of Other Intelligence Assessments on Postwar Iraq**

(U) In addition to the Intelligence Community Assessments (Appendices A and B), individual agencies within the Intelligence Community produced more narrowly focused assessments in 2002 and early 2003 about postwar Iraq. This section of the report briefly summarizes the assessments and briefing presentations.

### **Intelligence Assessments in February and March 2003**

( ) In February and March 2003, the CIA published two reports examining the issues of rapid military success in Iraq and the post-Saddam consequences for US military forces. The first, *Iraq: Potential Risks and Burdens in Coalition Rear Areas, Issues for US Forces Operating Behind Lead US Maneuver Elements*, assessed that “civil unrest, humanitarian burdens, and lingering military threats could pose challenges for the relatively small US military forces initially available in southern Iraq as the US main effort focuses on reaching Baghdad.”<sup>1</sup>

( ) Humanitarian problems “would be exacerbated by the extent to which a power and security vacuum develops in the south.”<sup>2</sup> These could include “looting, banditry, and difficulties in providing food, water, medical assistance, and other services.”<sup>3</sup> The report also pointed out “up to 4.5 million urban dwellers – about half the population of the south, probably would need food and water beginning after about one month [after US forces began operating in Iraq]” and that these and other humanitarian problems “could contribute to a severe economic breakdown in Southern Iraq.”<sup>4</sup>

( ) The CIA returned to these issues in the March 2003 report entitled, *Iraq: Consequences of a Rapid Coalition Victory*, that assessed that a quick collapse of Saddam’s regime “might prompt Iraqis to question the need – or justification – for a US occupation.” The report pointed out that rapid military victory “especially in the case of regime collapse rather than defeat” would probably leave Sunni control of major Iraqi institutions in place. Despite a shortened conflict, “humanitarian conditions in many parts of Iraq could rapidly deteriorate in a matter of days.” The report assessed that “many Iraqis probably would not understand that the coalition wartime logistic pipeline requires time to reorient its mission to humanitarian aid.”<sup>5</sup>

( ) The DIA issued a lengthy report, *Attitudes of Kurds, Shia, and Sunnis in a Post-Saddam Iraq*, in March 2003 that discussed how “assessing the basic attitudes of the three main ethnoreligious sectors in Iraq is fundamental to understanding the Iraqi political landscape following a successful overthrow of Saddam Husayn’s regime.”<sup>6</sup> At the beginning of the report, a separate text box noted intelligence gaps on Iraqi attitudes. It stated that while a large body of information was available about Kurdish views, little information was available for Sunnis and

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<sup>1</sup> CIA: *Iraq: Potential Risks and Burdens in Coalition Rear Areas*, February 3, 2003, p. i

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. i

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. i

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, p. 2, 4.

<sup>5</sup> CIA, *Iraq: Consequences of a Rapid Coalition Victory*, March 10, 2003, p. 1 - 2.

<sup>6</sup> DIA, *Attitudes of Kurds, Shia, and Sunnis in a Post-Saddam Iraq*, March 2003, pp. 1 - 2

[REDACTED]

less for the Shia, given the “climate of fear” in Iraq and the even “greater repression” under which the Shia lived.<sup>7</sup>

[REDACTED] The report catalogued the political agendas of each of the three groups. The report suggested the Kurds would want to make “the most of their gains” since 1991.<sup>8</sup> The first instinct of many Shia Arabs “will be to commit acts of vengeance against hated officials, [Shia] collaborators, and symbols of the regime.”<sup>9</sup> The report assessed that the Shia would probably be attracted to leaders who “promise to redress the imbalance of political power in their favor.” The report also assessed most Sunnis would be glad to see the end of Saddam’s regime, and while apprehensive about their future status, they may be receptive to democratic reforms.<sup>10</sup>

[REDACTED] The report stated that the degree to which Islam “will become a political factor among the Shia after Saddam’s demise is unclear.” The report further noted that “Islam has emerged as a more prominent factor in the lives of ordinary Iraqi Sunnis amid the hardships of the last decade . . . but the trend does not necessarily equate to openness to radical Islamic activism.” The degree to which radical Islam becomes a “growing or diminishing political force in post-Saddam Iraq is not clear.”<sup>11</sup>

[REDACTED] With respect to civil war, another text box indicated: “the risk of civil strife following the demise of Saddam’s regime will be high, but the possibility of full-scale civil war between major ethnoreligious sectors or other interest blocs will be much lower, although the possibility cannot be excluded.” The assessment noted that geographic separation of the various groups in most of Iraq “will mitigate the prospects for civil war” although it assessed “the greatest chances for sectarian and ethnic strife” exist in cities like Baghdad or in the Kirkuk-Mosul area.<sup>12</sup>

[REDACTED] The report noted that besides ethnoreligious groups, Iraq has “other, sometimes overlapping major interest sectors” such as externally based oppositionists and military officers, and examined them in turn. With respect to regime intelligence and security personnel, the report noted that “former security officials . . . may seek to emerge as respectable businessmen, but others may cross over into organized criminal or clandestine opposition activity.”<sup>13</sup>

[REDACTED] The CIA published an intelligence assessment on the civilian police force and judicial system and another on the senior officer corps of Iraq in March 2003. The report on the police force and judicial system, *Iraq’s Civilian Police Force and Judicial System*, provided a general description of the police force and judicial system, but highlighted the lack of information held by the US with respect to officials at the local level, including their identities, loyalties, or the involvement in regime brutality of individual police officers. The scope note stated “Our understanding of Iraq’s civilian police force and criminal justice system is limited by a lower

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<sup>7</sup> DIA, *Attitudes of Kurds, Shia, and Sunnis in a Post-Saddam Iraq*, March 2003, p. 2

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, p. 3

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, p. 3-4

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, p. 5

<sup>11</sup> Ibid, p. 3-4

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, p. 5

<sup>13</sup> Ibid, p. 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

intelligence collection priority compared to more prominent issues such as Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, conventional military capabilities, and leadership dynamics.”<sup>14</sup>

( [REDACTED] ) The lengthy March 2003 CIA report on the senior military officer corps, *The Iraqi Senior Officer Corps: Shaped by Pride, Prejudice, Patrimony, and Fear*, discussed the Sunni Arab dominance of the Iraqi officer corps and an extensive security oversight system that “traditionally emphasizes loyalty over competence.” It assessed that these factors “limit military effectiveness and pose challenges for rebuilding the military after Saddam.” The report also assessed that “reforming the officer corps and restructuring the armed forces into a force for national cohesion will be key to the stability of a post-Saddam Iraq.” The report included thumbnail biographies [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] Iraqi senior officers [REDACTED].<sup>15</sup>

( [REDACTED] ) On March 18, 2003, the Joint Intelligence Task Force – Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT) released a Special Analysis, *Iran: Prospects for a Post-Saddam Iraq*, that assessed that “Tehran seeks to influence future developments in a post-Saddam Iraq and accepts the short-term benefits of OPLAN 1003, namely, the ousting of President Saddam Hussein. However, the Iranians will not hesitate to turn against a long-term US presence [in Iraq] by encouraging surrogate elements to launch terrorist operations against US and/or coalition forces in Iraq.”<sup>16</sup>

( [REDACTED] ) On March 1, 2003, the intelligence organization for US Central Command produced a briefing presentation entitled *Phase IV IPB*.<sup>17</sup> The intelligence briefing consisted of 59 slides, which provided analysis on the demographics and government bureaucracy of Iraq, the status of the infrastructure, sources of potential conflict and regional views.<sup>18</sup>

( [REDACTED] ) The *Phase IV IPB* briefing juxtaposed intelligence assessments with Coalition military plans. For example, a briefing slide entitled “Challenges to Rebuilding Infrastructure” noted that “coalition forces will not target civilian infrastructure such as electric power, medical, dams, roads/bridges and water control” and assessed that the Iraqi civilian and industrial sectors had suffered twelve years of neglect.<sup>19</sup>

( [REDACTED] ) The *Phase IV IPB* briefing included a slide explaining “What to Expect After Regime Change” in the Baghdad area which noted the following:

- Continued armed opposition to Coalition forces unlikely once Saddam flees or is captured/killed.
- Most loyal tribesman will cease fighting for the regime once the outcome becomes apparent.

<sup>14</sup> CIA, *Iraq's Civilian Police Force and Judicial System*, February 25, 2003, pp. i - ii.

<sup>15</sup> CIA, *Iraqi Senior Officer Corps: Shaped by Pride, Prejudice, Patrimony, and Fear*, 18 March 2003, p. iii.

<sup>16</sup> DIA/JITF-CT, *Iran: Prospects for a Post-Saddam Iraq*, March 13, 2003, p. 1

<sup>17</sup> “IPB” is defined by the Department of Defense (DOD) as “intelligence preparation of the battlespace” in Joint Publication 1-02 “DOD Dictionary and Associated Terms.”

<sup>18</sup> United States Central Command, *Phase IV IPB*, as of March 1, 2003.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid, pp. 12

[REDACTED]

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- Pockets of Saddam loyalists will exist throughout the area which will provide safehaven for senior regime officials and where civil unrest is possible.
  - Sunni-Shia conflict/potential breakdown of law and order. Very high potential for Sunni-Shia violence in Baghdad. Retribution against former regime officials, security forces, and/or symbols of the former regime.<sup>20</sup>

( ) The *Phase IV IPB* briefing assessed that Iraqi Sunnis were not a monolithic block and that elements of some Sunni tribes had been alienated and marginalized by Saddam. In discussing Iran's influence in southern Iraq, the briefing also assessed that this "threat is probably overstated" and noted that Iraqi Shia are "strongly nationalistic" and "believe in a single Iraq."<sup>21</sup>

( ) The *Phase IV IPB* noted the potential for a breakdown of law and order in each geographic region of Iraq, that there were large mixed Sunni-Shia populations in Baghdad, Ramadi, Samarra, and Baqubah, and that "widespread conflict in Baghdad could incite/provoke violence in other areas" of Iraq.<sup>22</sup>

( ) The summary of the *Phase IV IPB* noted that "numerous HUMINT reports from credible Iraqis and other Arab sources state that US military or civilian control of the Iraq government will not be palatable to the population" and that "military occupation will not sell..."<sup>23</sup> The summary also highlighted that the "requirement to create and sustain a safe, secure and stable environment to support reconstruction must be received within the Iraqi population as legitimate..."<sup>24</sup>

( ) The summary of the *Phase IV IPB* included several conclusions which outlined "dos" and "don'ts" including:

Do:<sup>25</sup>

- Obtain an international mandate that delivers a message of legitimacy to Iraqi population;
- Have Iraqi representation as soon as possible;
- Preserve and reform Iraq's governmental ministries;
  - Screen out Ba'ath Party leadership
- Establish internal security and safe borders and institute the rule of law;
- Rapidly engage the Iraqi military in the reconstruction effort;
- Leverage well-rooted police and judiciary systems, which could promote good governance once stripped of their Ba'athist leadership.
- Build a central representative government that empowers local ethnic, tribal and religious leaders while encouraging them to support Baghdad's authorities.
- Be extremely sensitive to Shia holy sites in Karbala and Najaf.

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid, pp. 42

<sup>21</sup> Ibid, p. 49

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, p. 39

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, p. 53

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, p. 54

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, p. 57-58

[REDACTED]

Don't:<sup>26</sup>

- Accept an end state that removes Saddam and leaves other Bathists in power;
- Devolve power based exclusively on ethnicity, tribe or religion as it will undoubtedly fuel separatist movements and ethnic violence;
- Create any appearance of occupying Iraq.

#### Intelligence Assessments of January 2003

( [REDACTED] ) On January 28, 2003, the CIA disseminated a report on Iraq military reconstruction. The report, *Iraq: Salvaging Sovereignty, Security, and Honor, An Iraqi View of Rebuilding the Post-Saddam Military*, while focused on issues such as “force structure, demobilization, force integration, and rearmament issues,” discussed the “nationalist or communal sentiments” that would underlie “strongly independent” Iraqi views on these issues. According to the report, these military reconstruction issues “will pose significant challenges because of differences among the Iraqis and between the Iraqis and the United States.” The report found “Iraqis are likely to resort to obstructionism, resistance, and armed opposition if they perceive Washington is attempting to keep them dependent on the West.”<sup>27</sup>

( [REDACTED] ) In January 2003, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) of the State Department published a short summary of a seminar attended by one of its analysts on the Iraqi Shia with a Middle East historian and a “fairly independent” Iraqi oppositionist. According to INR, the two discussed that “although the first few weeks of conflict may go well militarily, there will be many pitfalls after that – for which the United States can expect to be blamed.”<sup>28</sup>

( [REDACTED] ) In January 2003, the CIA assembled a panel of non-government experts to address issues pertaining to democratization in Iraq and summarized their views in *Boosting Prospects for Iraqi Democracy*. According to the experts, prospects for “democratic stability in post-Saddam Iraq are limited for the next two years, but a US-led coalition could lay the groundwork for a consolidated democracy in five to 10 years out,” and “Iraq has a skilled technical cadre, viable institutions, oil reserves, and other resources for an effective and legitimate government.” The panel noted that Iraqis would accept help from the United States, United Nations, and European Union, but would view Arab, Turkish, and Iranian involvement as a threat. The experts noted that establishing internal security and safe borders would allay Iraqi fears that the country will plunge into chaos.<sup>29</sup>

#### Intelligence Assessments in December 2002

( [REDACTED] ) The December report, *Iraq Demographic Pressures Challenge Post-Saddam Stability*, took the long view on Iraq’s ethnic and religious divisions. The report noted that Iraq’s greatest risks for sudden and violent conflict existed “where Kurd and Arab areas meet, and in southern Iraq, including Shia neighborhoods in Baghdad, where long-repressed Shia citizens could lash

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid, p. 59-60

<sup>27</sup> CIA, *Salvaging Sovereignty, Security, and Honor, An Iraqi View of Rebuilding the Post-Saddam Military*, January 28, 2003, pp. i - ii.

<sup>28</sup> INR, *Iraq: Thoughts on the Shia... and Other Issues*, January 24, 2003

<sup>29</sup> CIA, *Boosting Prospects for Iraqi Democracy*, January 30, 2003, p. i

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

out against governmental, Ba'th Party, and security officials.”<sup>30</sup> It noted that “Iraq’s origins have led to a country composed of competing and often mutually antagonistic ethnic, religious, and tribal groups” and assessed that these “crosscutting ethnic and religious cleavages are likely to lead to violence as Saddam Husyan’s regime begins to fall, challenging the administration of a post-Saddam Iraq.”<sup>31</sup>

( [REDACTED] ) The report noted that “an unknown and possibly sizable portion of the population may be hostile to the United States and its allies and would resist suggestions for restructuring the government”<sup>32</sup> because more than 70 percent of the country had been born or reached adulthood since the first Gulf War, and had been inundated with anti-American propaganda. The report assessed that Iraq, with unemployment or underemployment reported at 50 percent, would need to create 240,000 new jobs each year for five years to accommodate the growing labor force.

( [REDACTED] ) In mid-December 2002, the NIC, the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (OSD-SOLIC), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff/J5/Strategy, Plans and Policy sponsored a conference and workshop on post-Saddam Iraq. The participants addressed possible security challenges, ethnic/religious violence, threats from terrorism and militant Islam, the problems of rehabilitating the Iraqi security services and accounting for and destroying WMD.<sup>33</sup>

( [REDACTED] ) The day-long gathering was an effort to consolidate in one place what was known, suspected and speculated about in the postwar environment in Iraq. The conference sponsors published and distributed conclusions, including the following:<sup>34</sup>

- “One key challenge to stability is long-term ethnic and tribal violence.”
- “Terrorism and the influence of militant Islam must be prevented from coming into Iraq from across the borders.”
- The United States will have to “focus immediately on security needs and will probably have to work with many of the local authorities and elements of the Iraqi regular army.”
- The “use of some Iraqi personnel, authorities, bureaucracy, and military would be necessary.”
- The military should be “de-Baathized, de-politicized, de-ethnicized and de-tribalized.”
- “Any perception of US acquisition or control of this [oil] resource could be especially damaging.”
- “It is important not to overestimate the capacity of Iraqi oil fields for the short-term .”
- “Suggestions that restoration and enhancement of the Iraqi oil industry can be self financed are optimistic at best.”

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<sup>30</sup> CIA, *Iraq: Demographic Pressures Challenge Post-Saddam Stability*, December 3, 2002, p. 1

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, p. i

<sup>32</sup> Ibid, p. ii

<sup>33</sup> NIC: *Alternative Outcomes in a War Against Iraq: Assessing Civil-Military Requirements in a Post-Saddam Security Environment*, December 19, 2002

<sup>34</sup> NIC: *Alternative Outcomes in a War Against Iraq: Assessing Civil-Military Requirements in a Post-Saddam Security Environment*, December 19, 2002

[REDACTED]

### Intelligence Assessments in November 2002

( ) By the end of 2002, CIA had published additional intelligence reports on Iraq's opposition groups, nationalist forces, and demographic pressures. In mid-November, CIA also began to disseminate intelligence reports on the condition of Iraq's basic infrastructure. This effort continued into early 2003. Some of these assessments reported on contemporaneous issues, but had relevance for post-Saddam conditions in Iraq. For instance, the report on Iraq's neglected water works began: "Iraq's water and sewage infrastructures are in poor condition and vulnerable to collateral damage during wartime activities. Since the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq's water supply and sewage systems have deteriorated due to neglect, a lack of spare parts, and a shortage of trained staff. Unreliable electricity and frequent power outages further stress water treatment facilities."<sup>35</sup> Another intelligence assessment noted that, "Two decades of war and repression in Iraq have decimated a once relatively robust medical system."<sup>36</sup>

( ) Likewise in November 2002, *Iraq: Opposition Positioning for Regime Change* discussed current intelligence on the prewar positioning of opposition groups inside and outside Iraq that had relevance for post-Saddam challenges in Iraq. The report noted that the efforts of the various Iraqi opposition groups to form alliances had "resulted in little definitive cooperation, confluence of political agendas, or lessening of longstanding competition between key leaders." The report also pointed out that Saddam's departure "would remove the one factor that has driven all past cooperation – hatred of the dictator and his regime."<sup>37</sup> The report discussed ways in which opposition elements could be helpful "in hashing out politically important issues" in post-Saddam Iraq but pointed out that "longstanding tensions, personal rivalries, and mutual suspicions remain close to the surface and are likely to flare as groups vie for positions of importance in key areas such as infrastructure – including oil and energy development – and politically influential subjects such as foreign and national security policy."<sup>38</sup> The report emphasized that "nevertheless, some opposition elements could prove to be helpful in advancing dialogue on key issues that will need to be addressed in a post-Saddam Iraq."<sup>39</sup>

### Intelligence Assessments in October 2002

( ) In October 2002, the National Intelligence Council published a 78 page NIE, entitled *Saddam's Preparations for War: Intentions and Capabilities*. While the NIE focused on at issues related to Saddam's near-term military objectives, strategy, and capabilities against the US and Coalition forces, one section of its judgments had implications for post-Saddam challenges in Iraq. The NIE assessed that "Even before the end of a war, US and Coalition forces will face enormous requirements to meet the humanitarian needs of Iraqi civilians. If Saddam adopted a scorched earth policy – and some intelligence reporting suggests he will – advancing forces will be confronted with large-scale destruction of oil and

<sup>35</sup> CIA, *Iraq: Neglected Waterworks, Flood Warfare Raise Humanitarian Stakes*, January 2003

<sup>36</sup> CIA, *Iraq: Poor Medical Infrastructure Offers Post-War Opportunity for US to Improve its Image in the Region*, November, 2002

<sup>37</sup> CIA, *Iraq: Opposition Positioning for Regime Change*, November 18, 2002, p.i

<sup>38</sup> Ibid, p. i

<sup>39</sup> Ibid, p. i



[REDACTED]

power facilities, the contamination of food supplies and other potential environmental devastation.”<sup>40</sup>

( [REDACTED] ) Another NIE produced in October 2002, *Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction*, also did not address the postwar period, but assessments concerning stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons had relevance to the postwar period.

( [REDACTED] ) Also in October 2002, the CIA produced three intelligence assessments and a summary of a simulation exercise on challenges for post-Saddam US policy. On October 18, 2002, the CIA disseminated, *Iraq: The Day After*. The report was intended to be “a first look at the possible broad contours of the Iraqi domestic, political, and regional scene in the immediate aftermath of a military overthrow of Saddam Husayn.”<sup>41</sup> The report noted that there were numerous political scenarios for post-Saddam Iraq and that what scenario prevailed would “depend largely on US decisions and actions.” The authors stated “we have chosen to focus on the prime concerns of the major players – both Iraqi and external – which will endure under any post-Saddam scenario.”<sup>42</sup>

( [REDACTED] ) The report discussed the attitudes of Iraqi internal and external players in the context of issues that included: the ouster of Saddam by the US or a Sunni coup; score-settling and war crimes trials; not possessing a dominant role in the new political order and seeing the external opposition obtain one; maintaining the territorial unity of Iraq; the introduction of democracy; the removal of weapons of mass destruction and compliance with UN Security Council resolutions; military reorganization; and short-term economic goals and expectations. The report assessed that: the Sunnis would have the most to lose with Saddam's ouster; the Shia would celebrate Saddam's ouster as an opportunity to right what they see as a grave historical injustice; most Shia would conclude that a secular and democratic Iraq served their interests and the Kurds would seek to formalize their autonomy, freedom and relative prosperity.”<sup>43</sup>

( [REDACTED] ) With respect to the role of the Ba'th Party in post-Saddam Iraq, the CIA's *Iraq: The Day After* report assessed that because “it has lost its power base and stands for little else than ‘Saddamism,’ we expect the Ba'th party to collapse with the regime.” The report also assessed that “Despite the improbability that Ba'th ideology will persist after Saddam, much of the infrastructure of the party within civilian sectors, such as professional and civil associations, may survive to facilitate a restoration of government services.” The report noted that “most Iraqis join [the Ba'th party] to get ahead” and the party “lacks ideological coherence or organizational autonomy.”<sup>44</sup>

( [REDACTED] ) In *Iraq: The Day After*, the CIA discussed the various Iraqi military and security services and noted that “many troops must be quickly disarmed and demobilized to remove a potential focal point for Sunni coup plotting.” The report said “certain units are so dominated by Tikriti

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<sup>40</sup> NIC, *Saddam's Preparations for War: Intentions and Capabilities*, October 2002, p i

<sup>41</sup> CIA: *Iraq: The Day After*, October 18, 2002, p. i, ii.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid, p. i

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, p. i, ii.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid, p. i

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

and Duri pro-Saddam tribesman or otherwise so intimately linked to the regime that their continued existence will be incompatible with democracy,” but noted that those officers who favor a professional military ethos or see themselves as guardians of Iraqi national values “may play a role in the post-Saddam military.”<sup>45</sup>

( [REDACTED] ) The paper also noted that Shia would celebrate Saddam’s ouster and “might welcome a preponderant US civilian and/or military role in post-Saddam Iraq” and that some Shia “may even call for a longer US occupation, arguing that their relative lack of experience government puts them at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the Sunnis.”<sup>46</sup>

( [REDACTED] ) Regarding the Sunnis, the report noted that they were the “most likely targets of score-settling” and are “likely to perceive the United States as the enemy.” Many Sunni “will be too stunned by their sudden loss of primacy to respond with vigor; others were Saddam’s victims; and Sunnis exiled in the West have assimilated many democratic norms and will have an impact on those who remained in Iraq.” It was assessed that the Kurds would be comfortable with whatever form of occupation that emerged.<sup>47</sup>

( [REDACTED] ) The CIA further developed its assessment of the Iraqi Ba’th Party in its October 31, 2002 assessment *The Iraqi Ba’th Party: Inexorably Tied to Saddam*. It assessed that the status of the Ba’th Party after Saddam “would depend on the nature of regime change” (such as natural causes, a coup) but that a US role in “removing Saddam and establishing a successor government would create a period of political dynamism...The Ba’th Party in its current form is unlikely to endure...because the Iraqi people would view retention of the Ba’th political structure as an unacceptable continuation of Saddam’s legacy.”<sup>48</sup>

( [REDACTED] ) The report emphasized that after the US removed Saddam from power, “government ministries providing critical services will need to be retained in some form after being purged of Saddam loyalists and restructured to eliminate the Ba’th party oversight mechanisms.” The report continued, “Many technocrats who joined the Ba’th Party to attain their positions are probably not ardent supporters of Saddam and could probably remain . . . [after having been] investigated and vetted.” The report noted, however, that the CIA did not know much about the loyalties, party affiliation, or potential criminal activities of most Iraqi military officers and government bureaucrats. The CIA acknowledged that little was known about most of these Iraqis [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and that most individuals would have to be investigated and vetted before being allowed to continue in their positions.<sup>49</sup>

( [REDACTED] ) The CIA produced an assessment of Iran as a player in post-Saddam Iraq in the October 2002 report, *Iran Wary of a US Attack on Iraq*. This report assessed that in the period following Saddam’s removal “Iran probably will seek to maximize its influence in Iraq while minimizing

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid, p. 1

<sup>46</sup> Ibid, p. 2

<sup>47</sup> Ibid, p. i, ii.

<sup>48</sup> CIA, *The Iraqi Ba’th Party: Inexorably Tied to Saddam*, October 31, 2002, pp. i, ii.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid, p. 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Washington's sway." The report noted that the shock within Iran over the successful US campaign in Afghanistan had led to an internal debate between pragmatists and ideologues within the country. The report discussed different policies Iran would take depending upon the success or difficulties faced by the US in Iraq.<sup>50</sup>

( [REDACTED] ) The final report of October 2002 from CIA, *Iraq Simulation Reveals Challenges for US Post Saddam Policy*, was the summary of a 3-day simulation sponsored by the CIA involving intelligence community analysts and outside experts. The simulation was premised on the scenario that a Sunni Republican Guard general would kill Saddam and his inner circle and sue for peace after US and United Kingdom forces entered southern Iraq; Kurds captured Kirkuk; [REDACTED]; and anti-Saddam tribes captured western Iraq. The report concluded that the simulation highlighted "the centrality of the US factor in post-Saddam Iraq and the need that the goals of the US be transparent." The report also assessed that the simulation revealed what the authors believed were the "attitudes of 'real' Iraqis," such as their support for an intact but federated Iraq, and the clout of leaders "with proven influence" on the ground in Iraq in contrast to exiled political leaders or party heads without armed followers.<sup>51</sup>

#### Intelligence Assessments in August 2002

( [REDACTED] ) In August 2002, the CIA produced three analytic products on postwar Iraq. One product examined the experience of the United States in Germany and Japan after World War II and compared this with the conditions likely to be faced by the US in Iraq. This product, *The Postwar Occupations of Germany and Japan: Implications for Iraq*, analyzed issues of importance in the post-World War II occupation of Germany and Japan such as: the extent of the US international mandate and regional support; the use of local authorities and institutions; the administration of the occupation through a limited staff backed by the presence of hundreds of thousands of occupation troops; the fact that atrocities had been committed against foreign or marginalized groups and not the populations of Germany and Japan as a whole; and the unifying symbols and traditions that were present in Germany and Japan after World War II.

( [REDACTED] ) The report observed that the US began the occupations of Germany and Japan with goals for sweeping political, social, and economic change that were "rapidly rolled back" to reflect changing US policy goals due to the start of the Cold War. The report also pointed out that postwar occupation planning for Germany and Japan started in 1942, almost as soon as the United States entered the war, and that the occupations of Germany and Japan were implemented in the context of defeated populations relieved to see the end of war. The report noted that in both countries the seven-year occupation "merely laid the foundation for success" and that "solidifying political gains required generational change."<sup>52</sup>

( [REDACTED] ) *The Postwar Occupations* report contrasted these factors found in Germany and Japan with the existing and historical conditions in Iraq. The report noted that "the religious and cultural gap between occupying Western forces and the Iraqi population" would be wider than what was the case in Germany or even Japan. The report noted that atrocities in Iraq had been

<sup>50</sup> CIA, *Iran Wary of a US Attack on Iraq*, October 25, 2002, pp. 7 - 10.

<sup>51</sup> CIA, *Iraq Simulation Reveals Challenges for US Post-Saddam Policy*, October 10, 2002.

<sup>52</sup> CIA, *The Postwar Occupations of Germany and Japan: Implications for Iraq*, August 7, 2002.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

committed against the population as a whole; the existing Iraqi bureaucracy is “not inclined to respond to local and ethnic minorities’ demands for greater control and inclusion,” and “the transformation of Iraq to a true democracy could require a US role lasting a generation.” The paper discussed many implications for the US occupation of Iraq, among them the importance of “obtaining an international mandate and regional support” and “the ability of the occupation forces to control the security situation.”<sup>53</sup>

[REDACTED] At the request of the National Security Council, the CIA further examined issues associated with the transition to a new Iraqi government after the fall of Saddam in the August 2002 report, *Can Iraq Ever Become A Democracy?* In the report’s scope note, the CIA stated that:

“This assessment fully accepts that traditional Iraqi political culture has been inhospitable to democracy. Nevertheless, we feel it is appropriate to explore, in a necessarily initial and speculative fashion, to what extent post-Saddam Iraq might possess some democratic building blocks, and under what circumstances these blocks might be used to construct a democratic government in post-Saddam Iraq.”<sup>54</sup>

[REDACTED] Within the context of the scope note, the report stated that, “On the surface, Iraq currently appears to lack both the socio-economic and politico-cultural prerequisites that political scientists generally regard as necessary to nurture democracy. Nevertheless, we believe that Iraq has several advantages that, if buttressed by the West, could foster democracy in post-Saddam Iraq.”<sup>55</sup> The advantages cited by the report included the return of exiled elites, a weak tradition of political Islam, near-universal revulsion against Saddam’s dictatorship, and economic resources. The report emphasized that “None of these factors should be seen as minimizing the obstacles to democratization in Iraq after Saddam.”<sup>56</sup>

[REDACTED] The CIA also pointed to Iraqi Kurdistan as a potential model for democratic development in the rest of Iraq. The report noted, for example, that “Iraqi Kurdistan has become one of the more democratic regions in the Middle East. In 1991 it was as badly off—both economically and from the viewpoint of political culture and history—as the rest of Iraq would likely be should Saddam be defeated.”<sup>57</sup>

[REDACTED] The report noted such “words of caution” as “we are uncertain how rapidly Iraq . . . can recover from the massive socio-economic and political damage inflicted by Saddam, especially since 1991.” The report assessed that without “long-term, active US/Western military, political, and economic involvement with the country” the chance of achieving even “the partial democratic successes of, for example, Iraqi Kurdistan to be poor.”<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> In October, 2002, the DCI Red Cell, an organization devoted to alternative analysis, produced an analytic piece entitled, “*Occupied Iraq*” – *Thinking about Post-Saddam Governance*, The Red Cell highlighted the “vast differences in culture and contexts” between the conditions in postwar Germany and Japan and the likely conditions in post-Saddam Iraq.

<sup>54</sup> CIA, *Can Iraq Ever Become a Democracy?*, August 8, 2002, pp. i - iv.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid, p. i

<sup>56</sup> Ibid, p. ii

<sup>57</sup> Ibid, p. i

<sup>58</sup> Ibid, pp. 6

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) The report assessed that, “In theory, Iraq should be better placed than its current dire economic statistics and dictatorial government suggest to recuperate lost ground and forge a more modern society once Saddam is toppled. It is also possible, however, that Saddam’s rule has damaged the Iraqi body politic and set back Iraqi socio-economic development in more severe ways that will require many more years to overcome. We simply cannot know until the dictator is gone.”<sup>59</sup>

( [REDACTED] ) The third CIA intelligence assessment from August 2002 was also produced in response to tasking by the National Security Council. This report, *The Perfect Storm: Planning for Negative Consequences of Invading Iraq*, was intended to set forth worst-case scenarios that might emerge from US-led regime change in Iraq. The scope note stated that the “spirit of the paper reaches beyond what we normally would assess as plausible” and that the report was intended to “look at a number of situations that, when taken separately or together, could complicate US efforts in a campaign against Iraq.” The negative consequences highlighted in the paper were: anarchy and territorial breakup in Iraq; instability in key Arab states; a surge of global terrorism and deepening Islamic antipathy toward the United States; major oil supply disruptions; and severe strains in the Atlantic alliance.

( [REDACTED] ) The CIA’s *Perfect Storm* report analyzed negative consequences before US military action, during initial US ground operations and during later phases of the US campaign and occupation. For the later phases, the report discussed scenarios, including: a Kurdish declaration of independence that provokes a military response first from [REDACTED] and Iran; Saddam survives the US invasion and retreats with Tikriti loyalists; al Qaeda operatives take advantage of a destabilized Iraq to establish secure safe havens from which they can continue their operations; Iran works to install a regime friendly to or tolerant of Iranian policies; European confidence in US leadership plummets and NATO loses much of its effectiveness as a major security institution; Afghanistan tips into civil strife as UN and other coalition forces are unable or unwilling to replace US military resources; and Pakistan is destabilized by violent demonstrations over Islamabad’s support for the US.<sup>60</sup>

( [REDACTED] ) The assessment noted that “in spite of the volatility and randomness of many of these scenarios and the ability of one event to spur unpredictable negative consequences for US interests, Washington retains the political leverage and military clout in the region to better the odds.” The assessment provided a list of “near-term tactical moves” that the US could take to minimize the chances of negative consequences for US interests. These “possible options” included:<sup>61</sup>

- Provide “concrete diplomatic steps toward Arab-Israeli peace;”
- “Public softening of US statements on Iran and back-channel assurances to Tehran on the duration and extent of US force deployments;”
- Major political and economic aid to Turkey and financial assistance to Jordan;
- Public guarantees to counter the Iraqi missile threat to Israeli territory.

<sup>59</sup> CIA, *Can Iraq Ever Become a Democracy?*, August 8, 2002, pp. i - iv.

<sup>60</sup> CIA, *The Perfect Storm: Planning for Negative Consequences in Iraq*, August 13, 2002, pp. i - ii.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid, pp. i - ii.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) In discussing the possibility of Iraq using chemical, biological or radiological (“dirty” bomb) weapons against US troops, the paper noted that “radiological and certain biological weapons can make an area uninhabitable for years.”<sup>62</sup>

#### Intelligence Assessments from Spring, 2002

( [REDACTED] ) Starting in the spring of 2002, the Intelligence Community began to produce reports premised on the possibility of a US-led effort to topple Saddam. These reports dealt directly with the conditions that might exist in Iraq following the removal of Saddam by a US-led coalition of forces. The few assessments of post-Saddam Iraq produced prior to 2002 focused on the removal of Saddam by a *coup d'etat* initiated either by the Iraqi military or oppositionists inside and outside of Iraq.

( [REDACTED] ) The Defense Intelligence Agency produced two briefing presentations in April 2002 that discussed the challenges that could arise for US military and coalition forces in the Phase IV post-combat phase of the war plan for Iraq. Both briefings identified key challenges in the longer term, including:<sup>63</sup>

- Baath Party resurgence
- “Can a viable consensus on Post-Saddam governance be formed?”
- “Desire to minimize US force presence could be at odds with desire for dramatic transformation of the political system” . . .
- “US effort to enable key players may be resented and opposed”
- “US occupation will stir nationalist and Islamic sentiments”
- “How to purge the government of Saddamists and hard-line Ba’this without destabilizing the regime? . . .
- Will ex-regime officials seek a comeback?
  - “launch a terror campaign or coup 6-12 months later?”
- “Will ex-regime officials become involved in organized crime?”

( [REDACTED] ) The first DIA briefing assessed that it was “too soon to know exactly what conditions will exist in Phase IV.” It assessed that the Iraqi Baath Party “will attempt to return by any means necessary” that “large portions of the population will remain intimidated,” and that the “Iraqi populace will adopt an ambivalent attitude toward liberation.” The briefing also assessed that “Significant force protection threats will emerge from the Baathists, the Jihadists and Arab nationalists who oppose any US occupation of Iraq.”<sup>64</sup>

( [REDACTED] ) The second DIA briefing noted that “managing rivalries will be a major challenge to the new regime.” DIA assessed that most seams and fissures will remain, but should be manageable and noted that most rivalries are intra-communal, not between ethnic or religious groups.” It summarized its assessment of post-Saddam challenges in three areas: “Economic

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<sup>62</sup> CIA, *The Perfect Storm: Planning for Negative Consequences in Iraq*, August 13, 2002, pp. i - ii. , pp. i - ii.

<sup>63</sup> DIA, *Knowledge of Iraqi Society: Policymaker Need for Insight and Looking at Post-Saddam Iraq*, April 2002.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

reconstruction[,] Managing rising expectations and nationalist backlash[,] Rebuilding the military to assure security.”<sup>65</sup>

( [REDACTED] ) The second briefing also outlined that potential post-war challenges that included, “preventing Kurdish separation, eradicating terrorists in Ansar area, managing inter-ethnic/tribal violence, gaining control of the regime’s geographic power base, and accounting for WMD.”<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> Ibid

<sup>66</sup> Ibid

[REDACTED]

